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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Yi Xiao
Doctor of Philosophy
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June 2020
Title: Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking: Evidence from Hedge Fund Leverage
Using novel leverage and managerial ownership measures derived from
public filings, this paper examines the role of managerial incentives in the use
of leverage, in the context of hedge fund industry. I find a positive and convex
relationship between fund leverage and the option-like compensation incentives,
with the leverage level being significantly higher as the fund’s asset under
management (AUM) nears its high-water mark (HWM). I also find that hedge
funds significantly reduce the leverage, when the incentive fee options are deep
out of the money. Further, greater managerial ownership is associated with higher
leverage, conditional on the incentive fee option being near the money. The findings
lend support to option-like compensation contracts and managerial ownership
improving incentive alignment between fund managers and investors. Interestingly,
I find that investor flows and fund performance have an overall positive reaction
to increases in leverage, which is mainly driven by well-performing funds with fund
values sufficiently close to the HWMs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rapidly growing hedge fund industry has become an increasingly
important player in the financial markets. Compared with $2 trillion in 2012, the
total capital of hedge fund industry rose to a record of $3.15 trillion in the third
quarter of 2017, according to data from Hedge Fund Research. One of the key
features distinguishing hedge funds from other investment vehicles is the use of
leverage. Hedge funds widely use external financing to lever up the underlying
positions, with the intent to boost performance by assuming greater risk. For
example, the gross assets of Citadel Advisors LLC and Millennium Management
LLC soared ninefold to above $115 billion in 2012, when tallied with investments
financed through borrowings.1 The use of leverage by hedge funds has important
implications on the welfare of investors, as well as the efficiency and stability of
the financial markets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Given the systemic
risk of hedge fund leverage on the financial markets, how leverage, a double-edged
sword, is deployed has drawn substantial attention from the regulatory agencies,
the media, and the academia (Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).2
Due to the opaque nature of lightly regulated hedge fund industry, fund
managers have substantial discretion in making investment and financing decisions
that are embedded with risk. Compensation contracts therefore play a vital role
in aligning incentives of fund managers with investors. The total compensation
1“Citadel, Millennium Above $115 Billion With Rule Change” from Bloomberg on April 13,
2012 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-13/citadel-soars-to-115-billion-with-
reporting-rule-change).
2e.g., “Highly Leveraged Hedge Funds Harbor Risk” from Wall Street Journal on Sept. 21,
2017 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/highly-leveraged-hedge-funds-harbor-risk-1506030920).
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of hedge fund managers features three components: the management fee, the
incentive fee, and the capital gain on managers’ ownership stake. The incentive
fee component is typically subject to the high-water mark (HWM) provision
ensuring that fund managers recover prior losses before being compensated with
the incentive fee. Similar to the stock options granted to corporate executives,
hedge fund managers receive asymmetric and nonlinear incentive fees that can be
viewed as a portfolio of call options (Goetzmann, Ingersoll Jr, and Ross (2003)).
In addition to the option-like incentive fee compensation, hedge fund managers
typically have a portion of their own capital invested in the funds that they
manage, which could account for a large proportion of their monetary rewards.
Given the unique compensation structure of hedge funds, it is important
for researchers and investors to understand the role of managerial incentives in
fund risk-taking measured by leverage. Prior theoretical literature has mixed
predictions on the optimal use of leverage by hedge fund managers in various
settings. The seminal work of Merton (1969) predicts that a CRRA-type manager
should maintain a constant leverage over time under linear fee structure. Carpenter
(2000) argues that the convexity of the incentive fee structure makes the manager
shun near-the-money payoffs, which ends up with either large gains or large losses.
Specifically, fund managers increase leverage and take on unbounded volatility,
when fund value falls and the incentive fee option becomes out of money. Similarly,
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) predict that risk averse managers with short-horizons
and outside career options will gamble by taking on higher risk, when the fund
value approaches the liquidation threshold.
Other papers point out that the convexity effect could be mitigated by
other factors, especially when the liquidation risk is high. Ross (2004) points
2
out that a convex (concave) compensation schedule does not necessarily lead to
less (more) risk aversion, depending on the distance of fund value to the HWM.
The net effect of option-like contracts on risk aversion can be ambiguous and
depends on the sum of three (sometimes offsetting) effects: the convexity effect, the
translation effect, and the magnification effect. The translation effect captures that
the compensation schedule moves the evaluation to a different part of the domain
of the original utility function, where the risk aversion could be either higher or
lower. The magnification effect depends on whether the fee schedule increases
faster or more slowly than the underlying value. A faster increasing fee schedule
magnifies the risk of any gamble and leads to more risk aversion. Depending on
the convexity (concavity) of the compensation schedule, the utility function, and
the domain, the convexity effect could be reinforced or mitigated by the other two
effects. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) introduce the high-water mark (HWM)
provision, and suggest that a risk-neutral hedge fund manager compensated by
contracts with HWM behaves exactly as a Merton-type CRRA investor, and places
a constant fraction of wealth in the risky assets. Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul
(2014) consider investor redemption as short put options, and find that managers
significantly reduce the leverage and risk-taking, when fund value approaches to
the strike price of the put options. Lan, Wang, and Yang (2013) argue that, in
the long-horizon setting, the concern of risk shifting may be overstated. They
show that the manager is motivated to take on higher leverage when the fund
value is close to HWM (i.e., when the manager is close to collecting incentive fees).
However, when the incentive fee option is deep-out-of-the-money, the loss of future
fees associated with costly liquidation induces the manager to reduce leverage to
increase the likelihood of fund survival. ”
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The aforementioned theories suggest that, with call-option like incentive
fee contracts, the fund manager’s decision on the optimal level of leverage depends
on the distance of current fund value to HWM (the moneyness of the incentive fee
option). Particularly, the convexity effect dominates when the incentive fee option
is near the money, and thus leads to higher risk taking.
Despite several theoretical studies suggesting a close tie between fund
leverage and managerial incentives, limited empirical evidence has been provided
to support or refute the models’ predictions, largely due to lack of high-quality
leverage data. Ang, Gorovyy, and Van Inwegen (2011) are the first attempt to
study the hedge fund leverage decisions using a proprietary dataset of leverage
ratios from a large fund of hedge funds. They find that predictable changes
in hedge fund leverage are mostly systematic, and there are few fund-level
idiosyncratic effects. Jiang (2018) constructs the leverage of hedge fund advisors
at the investment company level from public filings, and finds that highly-levered
hedge funds are more likely to fire-sell long positions in adverse market conditions.
Liang and Qiu (2019) obtain snapshots on fund leverage from TASS, and find that
fund characteristics such as current leverage, past performance and governance
quality affect the dynamics of leverage.
Using novel fund-level leverage and managerial ownership measures derived
from regulatory filings Form ADV, this paper aims to provide the large-sample
direct evidence on the relation between fund leverage and managerial incentives.
With the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, stricter regulations have been
imposed on the hedge fund industry in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008.
As a result, the fund-level data of hedge fund industry has become available from
4
Form ADV since 2011.3 In this study, I define fund leverage as the balance-sheet
gross leverage, which is the ratio of gross asset value (collected from Form ADV)
to net asset value (collected from commercial databases TASS and HFR). I also
develop a new measure of managerial ownership from Form ADV. Previous hedge
fund studies have used the cumulative value of the incentive fee reinvested as an
estimate of managerial ownership, which may be disconnected from the reality.4
First, while the conventional ownership estimate assumes that outflows are only
from outside investors, I observe almost symmetric distribution of managerial
ownership changes based on the information from Form ADV, suggesting that
outflows are also likely from fund managers’ own stake. Second, in my sample,
more than 45% of the funds are launched with at least 10% managerial ownership,
which suggests that fund managers usually invest their own money at the fund
inception. To overcome these limitations, I obtain the data of managerial ownership
directly from Form ADV, which is considerably more accurate than the one used
in the hedge fund literature.5 The time series variation of managerial ownership
also allows us to further investigate the insider net flows, defined as the annual
percentage change of managers’ own stake.6
The hedge fund industry is an interesting research setting to study the
relation between risk-taking and managerial incentives for several reasons. First,
fund leverage is a measurement of risk-taking with more clear-cut interpretation,
3Filing Form ADV is mandatory both for the advisors who are required to register with the
SEC and for exempt reporting advisors.
4e.g. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)
5Section 7.B of Form ADV mandate funds to provide fund-level information, in which Question
14 asks: “What is the approximate percentage of the private fund beneficially owned by you and
your related persons?”
6As identified by Item 7.A of Form ADV, 88.5% of ”related persons“ include ”sponsor, general
partner, managing member (or equivalent) of pooled investment vehicles”.
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compared with other proxies of non-financial corporations, such as risky
investments, R&D expenditures, and firm leverage. Further, I believe that the
managerial incentive measures of hedge funds in my approach are less subject to
the endogeneity concerns. As pointed out by Ross (2004), the main predictions
from the aforementioned theories are about the optimal risk taking by fund
managers in response to a set of predetermined compensation provisions. As
argued by Agarwal et al. (2009), the compensation contracts of hedge funds are
determined at the inception, and it is highly legally costly to modify the contracts
afterwards. The proxies for managerial incentives, the distance to HWM measures
(the moneyness of the incentive fee option), are purely based on the predetermined
contracting terms and past performance records, and therefore have less reverse
causality concerns.
I first find robust evidence that funds with greater option compensation
incentives, proxied by the moneyness of the incentive fee option, take significantly
higher leverage, which suggests that fund managers tend to increase the leverage
as the fund value moves closer to or exceed the HWM. I also demonstrate that
the positive relation between the option moneyness and fund leverage is convex, in
which the managers take on higher leverage at an increasing rate, as the fund value
nears the high-water mark. The results are consistent with the prediction in Ross
(2004), Buraschi et al. (2014) and Lan et al. (2013), which show that compared
with the out of the money scenarios, the convexity effect dominates around the
HWM. Further, I find that hedge funds significantly reduce their leverage by 6
percentage points when the incentive fee options are deep out of the money, which
is consistent with reducing risk due to liquidation concerns in the predictions of
Lan et al. (2013). In addition, management fee and incentive fee are both positively
6
associated with fund leverage. In short, the results demonstrate that managerial
incentives have a strong connection with fund risk taking both statistically and
economically.
Second, I examine the role of managerial ownership in leverage decisions. I
find that greater managerial ownership is associated with higher leverage, which
is consistent with the prediction of Lan et al. (2013). Further, I find that the role
of managerial ownership varies in the moneyness of the incentive fee option. In
the deep-out-of-the-money region, the relation between managerial ownership
and leverage is reversed, with funds of high managerial stakes reducing leverage
up to 13 percentage points, which suggests that larger personal stakes expose
fund managers to more downside risk and thus discourage them from excess risk
taking, when funds perform poorly. The findings suggest that managerial ownership
improves incentive alignment between fund managers and outside investors, by
making the managers care more about the fund value.
Third, I investigate the impact of leverage on fund flows and performance.
I find a positive and significant relation between past leverage and future risk-
adjusted NAV returns. Strikingly, the association is reversed, when fund value
declines at least 15% below the HWM, in which an increase in leverage leads to a
significant decline in fund performance. This result highlights the potential danger
of levering up any high risk strategies that may have caused poor performance in
the first place. Interestingly, I also find a positive relation between fund flows (both
insider flows and outsider flows) and future performance, consistent with the smart
money effect documented in the mutual fund literature. To alleviate the concern
that fund leverage may be mechanically related to NAV returns, I follow Griffin and
Xu (2009) and construct delivered returns based on disclosed equity holdings for
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fund advisors with at least 40% of assets invested in equities. I again find a strong
and positive overall relation between leverage ratio and future performance, either
on the four-factor adjusted alpha or on the Characteristic Selectivity (CS) alpha
for fund advisors. This positive overall relation is also mainly driven by funds with
values sufficiently close to the HWM.
Further, I extend the analysis to how fund leverage and managerial
ownership are related to fund flows. I find that investors (both outsiders and
insiders) have an overall positive reaction to an increase in leverage, conditional
on fund value being near-the-money. The result suggests that investors react
cautiously to higher leverage when fund value is deep below the HWM, consistent
with the risk shifting concern when the fund performs poorly. Further, I also find
that higher managerial ownership and better fund performance are associated with
higher overall future fund net flows, outsider flows and new sales (inflows). This
suggests that investments from managers and other insiders serve as a strong signal
of aligning interests with outside investors. In summary, I find that investor flows
and fund performance have an overall positive reaction to increases in leverage,
which is mainly driven by well performing funds with values sufficiently close to
the HWM. These results are consistent with the model predictions of Buraschi et
al. (2014) and simulation results of Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2016), which shed
light on the welfare consequence of leverage decisions on fund investors.
Finally, I conduct comprehensive robustness tests. To mitigate the sample
bias, I construct two samples with different sizes, one using perfect fund legal
name match and the other using fuzzy fund legal name match. I then show that
all the main results are robust to both of the samples, and to various alternate
specifications, including alternative incentive measures and additional clustering.
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To control for the effect of leverage constraints from the supply side of fund
leverage, I include the prime broker, fund domicile and clientele information into
the main regressions, and find that hedge funds with at least one prime broker,
with offshore investment vehicles, and with less individual investors, take on
higher leverage, likely due to more stable access to external financing, less legal
restrictions, and higher risk tolerance of the investor base.
This paper is the first study, to my knowledge, to comprehensively examine
the relation between hedge fund leverage and managerial incentives, using the
high quality public datasets drawn from SEC filings. This study contributes
to the literature by providing novel leverage and managerial ownership data to
link the theories with large-sample evidence. The findings shed light on optimal
contract design for hedge fund managers, and can also be relevant for managerial
compensation in general. This paper is also related to the literature on the role
of managerial incentives in managers’ risk-taking broadly in the corporate finance
literature, in which the empirical evidence has been mixed.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variable definitions.
Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 shows robustness tests and Section 6
concludes. Supplemental materials are included in the appendix.
7Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that the convexity in the compensation contract is
positively associated with R&D expenditures and firm leverage. Chava and Purnanandam (2010)
also find that the convexity is positively correlated with leverage and negatively related to cash
reserves. However, Lewellen (2006) finds that higher option compensation tends to deter debt
financing. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) show the change in option usage is generally unrelated
to firm risky investment and financial policies, by exploiting FAS 123R, an exogenous change in
the accounting benefit of stock options.
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CHAPTER II
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Merton (1969) shows that, under a linear fee structure, an investor with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) keeps a constant fraction of her portfolio
in risky assets, i.e., a constant leverage ratio. This constant fraction is typically
referred to as the Merton flat. Following the seminal work of Merton (1969), two
strands of theoretical literature have emerged to examine the impact of nonlinear
compensation incentives on the risk taking of fund managers. One strand examines
how risk averse managers react to option-like compensation structures in finite
period models. The other strand studies the optimal risk taking by risk neutral
managers in infinite horizon models.
Carpenter (2000) is the first paper studying the impact of a call option-like
fee structure on the optimal risk taking by a CRRA-type manager in a continuous
time finite period model. The key insight is that the convexity of the fee structure
makes the manager shun near-the-money payoffs and ends up with either large
gains or large losses. When fund value is near the HWM, the manager takes
more risk to increase her chance of ending up in the money. When fund value
declines below the HWM and approaches zero, the manager takes on unlimited
risk. Interestingly, the manager does not always increase her risk appetite with call
option-like fees. She actually decreases risk taking once the option is in the money
to a level even below the Merton flat and then gradually converge back to the flat
as the option value becomes deep in the money.
Ross (2004) questions the common folklore that option-like compensation
will make managers universally more or less risk averse. In a single-period model
and for a broad class of utility functions with varying degrees of risk aversion, Ross
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shows that the net effect of option-like contracts on risk aversion can be ambiguous
and depends on the sum of three (sometimes offsetting) effects: the convexity effect,
the translation effect, and the magnification effect. The convexity effect reflects the
common folklore that granting option-like compensation induces more or less risk
taking. The translation effect captures the fact that the option shifts or translate
the fee schedule to a different region of the utility function, which can be more or
less risk averse. Finally, the magnification effect depends on whether the option-like
structure makes the fee schedule increase faster or slower than the underlying fund
value. A faster increasing schedule will magnify the risk of any gamble and thus
make the risk-averse manger less willing to undertake the risky bet. In the case
of a fund manager with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) utility, adding
a call option to the linear fee structure does not necessarily increase risk taking
across all domains. When fund value gets close to the HWM, the convexity effect
dominates and leads to more risk taking. When fund value exceeds the HWM,
the addition of the call option increases the wealth of the fund manager and thus
moves her utility to a less risk averse region. Such translation effect reinforces the
convexity effect and induces more risk taking. However, the magnification effect
makes any gambles appear riskier and thus reduces risk taking. Hence, contrary
to the common folklore, the addition of a call option compensation may make the
fund manager more risk averse if the magnification effect dominates the other two
effects.
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) explicitly model the risk taking of a
CRRA-type manager compensated with a standard hedge fund package: a fixed
management fee and an incentive fee with HWM. In a one-period model with
endogenous fund closure, the paper presents analytical results consistent with Ross
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(2004) that the incentive fee does not universally increase risk taking. In particular,
the optimal risk taking depends on the distance of fund value to the HWM, or the
moneyness of the incentive fee option. When fund value is near the HWM, the
manager increases risk taking in an effort to make the incentive fee option in the
money. Once in the money, the manager initially reduces the risk taking even below
the Merton flat to lock in the incentive fee compensation and then revert back to
the Merton flat when sufficiently in the money. When the incentive fee option is
out of the money but away from liquidation, the optimal risk taking is the Merton
flat. Interestingly, the fund manager does not always take on unbounded risk when
fund value approaches the liquidation boundary. The optimal risk taking depends
on the fund manager’s outside options. When the outside options are high, the
fund manager will gamble by substantially increasing risk taking. In the case of
limited or no outside options, the fund manager will significantly reduce risk taking
to avoid liquidation.
Buraschi et al. (2014) expand the finite horizon framework by explicitly
modeling the impact of downside risk as short put options. Two types of risk
emerge when fund value declines far below the HWM: the funding liquidity risk and
the investor redemption risk. These two risks are akin to holding short positions in
two put options by the fund manager. The key finding is that the CRRA-type fund
manager significantly reduce risk taking to mitigate funding and redemption risks
when the incentive fee option is deep out of the money. The optimal risk taking in
other regions of moneyness is similar to the predictions in Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007).
A common theme of the above papers is that risk averse managers do not
always increase risk taking when compensated with a call option-like incentive
12
fee structure. The other strand of the literature argues that risk aversion is not
a necessary condition for this result. Instead, they show that even a risk-neutral
manager will behave in a risk averse way in a infinite horizon framework.
Panageas and Westerfield (2009) develop an infinite horizon model with
random fund liquidation. They show that even a risk-neutral manager will not take
on unbounded volatility given the call-option like incentive fee with HWM. Instead,
the manager behaves exactly like a Merton CRRA-type manager by investing
a fixed proportion of her portfolio in risky asset, i.e., constant risk raking. The
intuition for this surprising result is that incentive fee with HWM should be viewed
as a sequence of call options with changing strike prices and infinite horizons.
More risk taking today increases the likelihood that fund value drops below the
HWM, and thus decreases the values of all future options. The tradeoff between the
current and future payoffs lead the risk-neutral manager to behave like the Merton-
type risk averse investors.
Lan et al. (2013) also model the optimal risk taking by a risk-neutral
manager in an infinite horizon framework. They differ from Panageas and
Westerfield (2009) by incorporating a much richer and realistic compensation
structure including management fee, HWM-indexed incentive fee, endogenous
liquidation, leverage constraint, and managerial ownership. Similar to Panageas
and Westerfield (2009), the risk-neutral manager trades off the current payoff
against future compensation and behave in a risk averse manner. However, the
mechanisms for the trade-off differ between the two models and thus lead to
different equilibrium risk taking. Compared with the constant risk taking in
Panageas and Westerfield (2009), both the endogenous risk attitude and the
optimal leverage ratio in Lan et al. (2013) is stochastic and depends on the distance
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of fund value to the HWM. An increase in leverage can amplify expected return
(higher future compensation) but can also increase the risk of forced liquidation
(permanent loss of future fees). The aversion to downside risk is the main driver
for the key model prediction that the manager becomes more (less) risk averse
and take on lower (higher) leverage when the fund value moves further away from
(closer to) the HWM.
One consistent prediction from the aforementioned theoretical studies is that
the convexity effect dominates when the incentive fee option is near the money and
thus leads to higher risk taking. I therefore have the following hypothesis for near-
the-money leverage ratio:
H1: All else equal, when fund value is near the HWM, the manager increases
the leverage ratio.
When the incentive fee option is in the money, Ross (2004) shows that for
a general class of utility function with risk aversion, the impact on the manager’s
risk attitude can be ambiguous. Assuming CRRA utility and reasonable parameter
values, Carpenter (2000), Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), and Buraschi et al. (2014)
all predict that the fund manager will first reduce leverage to lock in the incentive
fee and then increase the leverage again when the incentive fee option is sufficiently
in the money. I therefore have the following hypothesis for in-the-money leverage
ratio:
H2: All else equal, when fund value exceeds the HWM, the manager initially
decreases the leverage ratio and then increases again.
In the case of the incentive fee option being out of the money, the optimal
leverage ratio depends on the assumptions on the downside risk and the manager’s
outside options. With limited downside risk and/or high outside options, Carpenter
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(2000) and Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) both predict gambling behavior and thus
higher leverage ratio. On the other hand, with high liquidation risk and limited
outside options for the fund manager, Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Lan et
al. (2013) show that the fund manager will significantly reduce the leverage ratio
when fund value is near the liquidation boundary. I therefore have the following
two alternative hypotheses for out-of-the-money leverage ratio:
H3A: All else equal, when fund value falls sufficiently below the HWM, the
manager increases the leverage ratio for a better chance of ending up in the money.
H3B: All else equal, when fund value falls sufficiently below the HWM, the
manager decreases the leverage ratio to avoid costly liquidation and loss of future
fees.
Few theoretical studies have examined the role of managerial ownership in
risk taking. Lan et al. (2013) directly models the impact of managerial ownership
and show that higher managerial ownership in general leads to higher leverage.
This is because a larger personal stake better aligns the interests between the
manager and fund investors and thus mitigates the negative effect of risk aversion
on risk taking. Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) and Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007) show that the same personal stake or a fixed management fee exposes
the manager to downside risk due to the loss from personal capital or fee income
from liquidation. The exposure to such downside risk would discourage the fund
manager from taking big gambles when the fund is performing badly. I therefore
have the following hypothesis on the impact of managerial ownership on leverage
ratio:
H4: All else equal, higher managerial ownership in general induces the
manager to take on higher leverage. However, when fund value falls sufficiently
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below the HWM, higher managerial ownership mitigates the risk taking incentives
and leads to lower leverage.
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CHAPTER III
DATA DESCRIPTION
In this section, I describe the data sources, the construction of key variables,
and the summary statistics.
Data Sources
I obtain fund characteristics data from the following sources: Form ADV
and Form D filings with the SEC, two commercial databases including Lipper
TASS and Hedge Fund Research (HFR), Thomson Reuters 13F database, and the
SEC 13F filings.
Prior to the 2008-2009 financial crisis, hedge funds mostly avoided the
public disclosure mandated by the SEC for registered investment advisors. The
passage of the Dodd Frank Act in 2011 requires all investment advisers with gross
assets under management over $150 million to register and file Form ADV with
the SEC on an annual basis. Part 1 of Form ADV provides fund-level information
including fund legal names, fund advisors, fund type, gross asset value (GAV),
and managerial ownership. I keep all private funds with self reported fund type as
“hedge fund” and with GAV above $1 million. GAV is the key variable used later
to compute fund-level leverage ratio. It is defined as the gross value of regulatory
assets under management (RAUM), which include all of the assets for which the
private fund provides continuous and regular supervisory or management services.
Broadly speaking, RAUM includes cash and cash equivalents, long and short
positions, leverage, margin, family or proprietary accounts, accounts for which
the manager receives no compensation for its services, and accounts of clients who
are not United States persons.1 Hence, GAV is the gross value of assets funded
1see Item 5b of Form ADV and Filing Instructions for more information:
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/ia-4509-appendix-b.pdf.
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by both equity capital and debt (i,e, leverage). From Form ADV, I collect 69,984
observations for 21,021 hedge funds from 2011 to 2017. In addition, I obtain the
fund-level new sales (money inflows) data from Form D and merge it with Form
ADV data by filing numbers.
I next match the hedge fund sample collected from Form ADV with the
combined list of hedge funds in two commercial databases TASS and HFR.2 In
the first stage, I identify overlapping fund management firms using the SEC filing
numbers and names of fund advisors. In the second stage, within the matched fund
management firms, I identify overlapping hedge funds matched with fund legal
names. Because fund names may be recorded differently between Form ADV and
commercial databases, I construct two matched hedge fund samples: one based
on perfect name matches and the other based on fuzzy name matches. Finally, I
manually check the matched funds based on the fund managers, the legal structure,
and the domicile information to ensure that all fund identifiers retrieved from Form
ADV are unique in the final data set. The initial smaller perfectly matched sample
contains 1,892 hedge funds, 1,051 from HFR and 841 from TASS. The initial larger
fuzzy-matched sample contains 3,131 hedge funds, 2,160 from HFR and 971 from
TASS. For robustness purpose, I conduct all empirical analyses with both fund
samples but only present the results based on the fuzzy name match sample for
brevity. I report the results based on the exact name match sample in an online
appendix.
I collect a host of fund-specific information that are reported to TASS and
HFR, including net asset value (NAV), net-of-fee return, management fee, incentive
2I delete the duplicate funds from TASS and HFR by SEC fund identifier. I keep the TASS
observations of duplicate funds becasue TASS has longer history of the data in the sample.
I also delete the observations for which the return and net asset data in TASS and HFR are
inconsistent.
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fee, high-water mark provision, redemption period, lockup period, advance notice
period, and fund strategies. In the next section, I define the main variable of
interest, leverage ratio, by combining the GAV and NAV measures. In practice,
the level of leverage likely depends on a fund’s investment strategy. For example,
long/short equity funds tend to use relatively low leverage due to high basis risk. In
contrast, fixed income arbitrage funds tend to use high leverage to magnify small
price discrepancies from exploring arbitrage strategies with low basis risk. Hence,
I control for strategy fixed effect in the main regressions. Following Agarwal et al.
(2009), I classify hedge funds into six broad strategy categories: directional, relative
value, security selection, multi-process, fund of funds, and other.
I construct holdings-based returns for single-fund management firms based
on both Thomson-Reuters 13F database and the SEC 13F filings. Franzoni,
Ben-David, Moussawi, and Sedunov (2019) find that the Thomson-Reuters data
have several quality issues causing a substantial increase in omitted institutions
and excluded securities since 2013, compared with the original SEC 13F filings.
For robustness, following Franzoni et al. (2019), I collect the quarterly holdings
data from both Thomson-Reuters and the SEC EDGAR filings system. I then
use historical holdings to map the CIK identifier from the SEC filings to the
corresponding mgrno in Thomson Reuters to match management firms between
the two databases. Finally, I supplement the Thomson Reuters data with the SEC
13F filings data for the post-2013 period.
Definition of Key Variables
I now define several key variables used in subsequent empirical analysis and
present the summary statistics.
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Leverage. My key measure of risk-taking by a hedge fund is the
leverage ratio. Following Ang et al. (2011), I define the leverage ratio for fund i
at year-end t as the balance-sheet gross leverage ratio: Li,t =
GAV i,t
NAV i,t
, where GAV is
from Form ADV and NAV is from TASS and HFR. It measures the total value of
assets invested by the hedge fund as a multiple of its equity capital. One caveat of
this explicit leverage definition is that I do not take into account the use of implicit
leverage, e.g., derivatives. Hence, my measure of leverage may understate the total
risk exposure for a hedge fund.
Managerial Incentives. One common implication from the theoretical
literature reviewed in Section 2 is that a fund manager’s risk taking incentives
depend on the distance of fund value to the HWM, i.e., the moneyness of the
incentive fee option. I therefore use the distance to HWM (the moneyness of the
incentive fee option) as the main explanatory variable. The challenge is that I
do not directly observe the HWM over time and have to estimate it. Following
Aragon and Nanda (2012) and Agarwal et al. (2009), I construct two measures
of the moneyness of the incentive fee option: one based on the net-of-fee returns
and the other based on gross-of-fee returns, respectively. I assume that the fund
manager will be evaluated for incentive fees at the end of the year based on the
HWM determined at the beginning of the year. The two measures differ in whether
the HWM is estimated based on net-of-fee return or gross-of-fee return.
For the net-of-fee return moneyness measure, I use the NAV returns
provided by TASS and HFR to estimate the fund’s HWM. I assume that fund i’s
initial HWM (HWM i,1) is its NAV (Ai,0) at inception (normalized at $1), i.e.,
Ai,0 = 1 and HWM i,1 = 1. I then estimate the NAV and HWM recursively
using Ai,t = Ai,t−1(1 + Ri,t) and HWM i,t+1 = max(HWM i,t, Ai,t), where Ri,t
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is the annual return based on the monthly NAV returns provided by TASS and
HFR. This approach allows us to avoid dropping observations with missing NAV
data.3 I define the net-of-fee return moneyness measure at the beginning of yeat t
as Dnet,t =
At
HWMt+1
, which by construction is capped by 1.4
For the gross-of-fee return moneyness measure, I follow the procedure
in Agarwal et al. (2009) and estimate the gross return based on certain key
assumptions.5 I assume that fund flows occur at the year end and a new investor
enters the fund at the year end in case of fund inflows. I treat the incentive fee
contract for each investor as an independent option. For each investor, I separately
estimate the market value of her investments (A) and HWM at each year end
recursively based on the gross returns. The total incentive fee compensation
for managers is viewed as the sum of the incentive fee options for all individual
investors. I define the gross-of-fee return moneyness measure as a value-weighted
average of each individual investor’s distance to HWM: Dgross,t =
∑
i ωi
Ai,t
HWM i,t+1
,
where the weights are computed as the market value of each investor’s investments
divided by the total market value summed across all investors. This measure is also
capped by 1 by construction.6
Both moneyness measures defined above are capped at 1 by construction.
For robustness and a better understanding of managerial risk taking when the
incentive fee option is in the money, I also construct two contemporaneous
3Missing NAV observations account for about 20% of my sample.
4For the funds that do not have the high-water mark provision, the option exercise price is
higher than the current fund value by the hurdle rate. The results are robust when excluding
those funds from the analysis, which account for 10% of the sample.
5See Appendix A in Agarwal et al. (2009) for a detailed description.
6The downside of using the gross-of-fee return moneyness measure is that I have to drop the
funds without the full history of NAVs due to the need of using NAVs in calculating the fund
flows for each investor.
21
moneyness measures: mid-year moneyness and year-end moneyness. Following
Aragon and Nanda (2012), the mid-year moneyness measure is defined as the
ratio between a fund’s mid-year NAV and its HWM: Dmid−year,t+1 =
At(1+Rt,t+12
)
HWMt+1
,
where Rt,t+ 1
2
is the cumulative NAV return in the first half of the year. The year-
end moneyness is defined as the ratio between a fund’s year-end NAV and its
HWM: Dyear−end,t+1 =
At+1
HWMt+1
. The mid-year moneyness and year-end moneyness
measures could exceed 1, depending on fund performance over the year relative to
the HWM.
Managerial Ownership and Insider Flows. I collect managerial
ownership data directly from Form ADV and use it to compute insider flows. I
believe that this is a marked improvement over the managerial ownership used in
the prior literature. For example, Agarwal et al. (2009) use the cumulative value
of the incentive fees reinvested as the proxy for managerial ownership, which is
based on the restrictive assumptions that fund managers have no initial personal
stake and never make any additional investments (except for the incentive fees)
or withdrawals. my measure is based on regulatory filings and thus more accurate
and comprehensive. Section 7.B.(1) of Form ADV mandates investment advisors
to disclose a host of fund-level information, in which Question 14 specifically asks:
“What is the approximate percentage of the private fund beneficially owned by you
and your related persons”.7
Following Goetzmann et al. (2003), I define the total net flows for fund i
in year t as Netflowi,t =
NAV i,t−NAV i,t−1(1+Ri,t)
NAV i,t−1
. By exploiting the managerial
ownership data, I further separately define insider and outsider net flows as
follows. Insider net flows are measured as the scaled dollar flows into the fund
7According to Item 7.A of Form ADV, 88.5% of “related persons” include “sponsor, general
partner, managing member (or equivalent) of pooled investment vehicles”.
22
from managers and realted persons: Insideri,t =
Mi,t∗NAV i,t−Mi,t−1∗NAV i,t−1(1+Ri,t)
Mi,t−1∗NAV i,t−1 ,
where Mi,t is the managerial ownership of fund i at year-end t. Similarly, I define
outsider net flows as the scaled dollar flows from outside investors: Outsideri,t =
(1−M i,t)∗NAV i,t−(1−M i,t−1)∗NAV i,t−1(1+Ri,t)
(1−M i,t−1)∗NAV i,t−1
,
Other Variables. High-water Mark is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the fund has HWM provision, and equals 0 otherwise. Prime Broker
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has at least one prime broker,
and equals 0 otherwise. Lockup Period is the minimum time (in months) that
outside investors must keep their investments in the fund before requesting
redemption. Advance Notice Period is the minimum notice period (in days)
required for investors making redemption requests. Redemption Period is the time
(in days) that the fund takes to return the money to investors after the redemption
date. Fund Age is the time (in years) since the fund inception. Annual Return
(Volatility) is the mean (standard deviation) of monthly returns during the year.
I also construct two risk-adjusted performance measures. Alpha-4factors is the
monthly alpha computed based on the factor loadings estimated from the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model using the past 24-month NAV returns. Similarly, Alpha-
7factors is the monthly alpha computed based on the factor loadings estimated
from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model using the past 36-month NAV
returns.
Summary Statistics
Table B.1 presents the summary statistics of key fund characteristics for my
matched sample consisting of overlapping funds between the Form ADV sample
and the TASS/HFR sample. The average fund GAV and NAV are $390 million
and $267 million, respectively. Consistent with well documented evidence that
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hedge fund size is positively skewed, I also find that the mean fund size is much
larger than the median. The average fund age is 9 years. Hedge fund managers
tend to have a large personal stake in their funds, with an average managerial
ownership of 21%. This highlights the importance of studying the impact of
managerial ownership on risk taking. Regarding the compensation structure, the
mean (median) management fee and incentive fee are 1.4% (1.5%) and 17% (20%),
respectively. Moreover, 90% of funds in my sample have HWM provision. In terms
of redemption policy, the average fund in my sample has a 6-month lockup period,
a 53-day advance notice period, and a 75-day redemption period. Finally, about
70% of funds in my sample use prime brokers. To address the concern that my
matched sample may not be representative of the hedge fund universe, I also report
summary statistics based on either the entire Form ADV sample or the combined
TASS/HFR sample. For most fund characteristics, the summary statistics for my
matched sample are quite similar to those for the whole sample. Compared to the
whole sample, funds in my matched sample tend to be older and more likely to
use prime brokers. This provides comfort that funds in my matched sample have
similar overall characteristics as the hedge fund universe.
Table B.2 Panel A reports the summary statistics of Gross Leverage, my key
variable for managerial risk taking. The average gross leverage ratio in my sample
is 1.42, lower than the average ratio of 2.13 as reported in Ang et al. (2011) based
on proprietary data from 2004 to 2009. However, they also document that hedge
funds started to delever since mid-2007 and the average leverage decreased to 1.5 in
October 2009 at the end of their sample period, which is comparable to my sample
average. Hence, it appears that the average hedge fund leverage in the postcrisis
period did not revert to the precrisis level. Although the overall use of leverage by
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hedge funds appears to be modest, the cross-sectional variation is considerably
large with a standard deviation of 88%. While about a quarter of hedge funds
do not take on any leverage, the top 10% funds take on close to or over 3 times
the leverage. There are also considerable variations in the use of leverage across
investment strategies. Relative value funds have the highest average leverage ratio,
followed by direction traders, multiprocess, and security selection funds with similar
average leverage ratios. Funds of hedge funds on the other hand tend to take on the
lowest leverage. The cross-strategy variation is largely consistent with the summary
statistics disclosed in the SEC’s “Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Form
PF Data.”8 One notable difference is that the average leverage of relative value
funds in the SEC’s report is twice as large as the one in my sample, possibly due to
the different strategy definition.
Table B.2 Panel B reports the summary statistics for other key variables
used in the regression analyses. Regardless of the distance to HWM (the moneyness
of incentive fee options) measures, I observe substantial clustering around the
HWM as shown in Figures A.1 and A.2. The mean of the net-return moneyness
measure is 96% with 9% standard deviation. I also find some large deviations from
the HWM. For the midyear moneyness measure, the bottom 10% of fund years
are at least 15% below the HWM, while the top 10% of fund years are at least
10% above the HWM. For the entire sample period, 38% fund years are below the
HWM, or under the water. The net fund flows are on average 9% per year with a
standard deviation of 63%. I further separately report the statistics for insider and
outsider net flows. I find that, compared with outsider net flows, insider new flows
8In addition to Form ADV, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires investment advisors to file
Form PF and report more detailed financial information. However, Form PF filings are strictly
confidential and the SEC only makes some key summary statistics available to public in the
annual report “Annual Staff Report Relating to the Use of Form PF Data.”
25
are on average larger (30% vs. 11% per year) and are also more volatile (161% vs.
88% annual standard deviation). This suggests that flows from fund managers and
related persons are an important part of total net fund flows and these insiders
appear to adjust their capital even more actively than outside investors.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, I present the main results on how managerial incentives
affect the use of leverage and the implications of leverage on fund flows and
performance.
Baseline Linear Models of Managerial Incentives and Leverage
I begin with investigating the relation between managerial incentives
and fund leverage using multivariate linear regression models, in which changes
in leverage are regressed on distance to HWM measures (the moneyness of the
incentive fee option) and managerial ownership. I believe that my empirical
approach is less subject to the endogeneity concerns for the following reasons.
As pointed out by Ross (2004), the main predictions from the theories reviewed
in Section 2 are about the optimal risk taking by fund managers in response
to a set of predetermined compensation provisions. To test these predictions, I
develop my main proxies for managerial incentives, the distance to HWM measures
(the moneyness of the incentive fee option), purely based on the predetermined
contracting terms and past performance record. Because the compensation
contracts for hedge fund managers are determined at fund inception and rarely
change over the fund life due to high costs of modification (Agarwal et al. (2009)),
my distance to HWM measures have less reverse causality concerns. 1
1For the four distance measures, only the net-return and gross-return moneyness measures are
purely based on past performance and are thus subject to less endogeneity concerns. The other
two measures including mid-year and year-end moneyness use contemporary returns and thus have
some concerns.
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I estimate the following linear regression with the lagged dependent variable
to examine how managerial incentives impact the dynamics of fund leverage.
Li,k,t = α + β1Li,k,t−1 + β2Moneynessi,k,t−1 + β3Managerial ownershipi,k,t
+ β4Management fee+ β5Incentive fee+ β6Controlsi,k,t−1 + λt + ηk + εi,k,t,
(4.1)
where Li,k,t stands for the gross leverage of fund i with strategy k at year-end t.
I include the lagged leverage Li,k,t−1 in the specification to control for the mean
reversion in leverage changes (Ang et al. (2011)). The variables potentially affecting
managerial incentives of risk taking include the distance to HWM (net-return
moneyness, gross-return moneyness, mid-year moneyness, and year-end moneyness),
managerial ownership, management fee, and incentive fee.
I also control for other fund characteristics that may affect the leverage
decision. Investments in illiquid assets could discourage fund managers from taking
on high leverage. This is because the short-term financing and short notice on
changes of financing terms from prime brokers result in a mismatch between the
duration of fund assets and liabilities. Aragon (2007) shows that hedge funds
investing illiquid assets tend to impose stricter terms for investor redemption
to attenuate the duration mismatch of their balance sheet. I therefore control
for asset illiquidity by including redemption period, advance notice period, and
lockup periods in the regressions. Since hedge funds often use leverage to target
a particular level of volatility, I control for the standard deviation of monthly
NAV returns in the previous year. Larger and older funds are likely to have more
established relation with prime brokers and thus easier to obtain financing. I
therefore include fund net assets, fund age, and fund net flows in the regressions.
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Finally, hedge funds are faced with maximum leverage constraints imposed
by the providers of leverage, which are commonly their prime brokers. Hedge
fund managers make a decision on optimal leverage as a function of the perceived
risk-return trade-off, subject to exogenously imposed leverage limits. Further,
the margin requirement and the implied level of leverage depends on the type
of securities traded, the exchange and the creditworthiness of the fund, subject
to regulations. For example, the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation T allows
investors to borrow up to a maximum 50% of a position on margin with the
implied leverage level at 2. Hedge funds can establish offshore investment vehicles
and obtain higher leverage than the level allowed by regulation in less restrictive
jurisdictions. Another significant financing source of hedge fund is their client base,
which also has the ability to pull financing out of the fund. The financing risk is
considered as a short put option in Buraschi et al. (2014), which also impacts the
hedge fund leverage decision. In short, whether to have access to prime brokers,
fund registration place, and investor clientele can also affect the use of leverage.
To differentiate and control for the effect of leverage constraints from the supply
side of fund leverage, I therefore include the use of prime brokers, onshore vs.
offshore registration, and the percentage of high net worth individuals in the fund’s
investor base as additional control variables. All regressions include the year fixed
effect λt to control for the macroeconomics conditions, and the strategy fixed effect
ηk to control for the strategy-specific characteristics, as suggested in Ang et al.
(2011). The standard errors are clustered both by fund. In the robustness tests
with alternative specification, the results are also robust to additional clustering by
strategy and by year.
29
Table B.3 presents the baseline linear regression results from estimating
Equation 4.1. The coefficients on all four distance to HWM measures are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. This result suggests that fund
managers tend to increase the leverage as the fund value moves closer to or exceed
the HWM. Regarding the economic significance, one standard deviation change
in the net-return distance is associated with 5 percentage points change in fund
leverage, which is considerably large given that borrowing on average accounts
for 42% of the fund’s net asset. I also find that higher managerial ownership is
significantly associated with higher leverage. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in managerial ownership is related to a 4 percentage points increase in
fund leverage. This is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 4 based on Lan
et al. (2013). In addition, management fee and incentive fee are both positively
associated with fund leverage. Overall, the results from Table B.3 demonstrate that
managerial incentives have a strong connection with fund leverage both statistically
and economically.
The coefficients of the control variables are largely intuitive and consistent
with the prior literature. The positive and significant coefficients of lagged leverage
indicate persistence of leverage ratio, but the magnitude (about 0.30) is quite
moderate. The negative coefficients of advance notice period, redemption period,
and lockup period are consistent with the conjecture that funds with more illiquid
holdings tend to take less risk, given the liquidity constraints. I also find that larger
and older funds, presumably with larger borrowing capacity and better connection
with prime brokers, tend to take on higher leverage.2 Similar to the findings of Ang
2e.g., “U.S. Regulators to Focus on Borrowing at Large Hedge Funds” from Wall Street
Journal on April 18, 2016 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulators-to-focus-on-borrowing-
at-large-hedge-funds-lew-says-1461015212).
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et al. (2011), the negative coefficient of return volatility confirms the prediction
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that more volatile returns require higher
margins and thus lead to lower level of leverage. 3
Finally, I find that funds with prime brokers, offshore registration, and larger
institutional investor base tend to take on higher leverage. The higher risk taking
by these funds is likely due to better access to prime brokers, less legal restrictions,
and higher risk tolerance of the investor base.
Non-linear Models of Managerial Incentives and Leverage
Hypotheses 1 to 3 predict that fund managers’ risk taking incentives are
likely to vary, depending on the distance of fund value relative to the HWM (the
moneyness of the incentive fee option). In this section, I explore the non-linear
relation between managerial incentives and leverage. Specifically, I divide the
distance to HWM measures into four regions: [0,0.85], (0.85,0.96], (0.96,1.1], and
above 1.1. The cutoffs are chosen based on the distribution of mid-year distance
measures as reported in Table B.2 Panel B. For the net-return and gross-return
distance measures, only the first three regions apply because these two measures
are capped at 1 by construction. The deep-out-of-the-money region ([0,0.85])
includes the bottom 10% fund-year observations in which fund values are at least
15% below the HWM. The out-of-the-money region ((0.85,0.96]) includes roughly
the 10th-25th percentiles of fund-year observations in which fund values are 4-15%
below the HWM. The close-to-the-money region ((0.96,1.1]) includes fund-year
observations from 4% below to 10% above the HWM, accounting for about 65%
of the fund-year observations. Finally, the deep-in-the-money region (above 1.1)
3e.g., “Highly Leveraged Hedge Funds Harbor Risk” from Wall Street Journal on Sept. 21,
2017 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/highly-leveraged-hedge-funds-harbor-risk-1506030920).
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includes the top 10% of fund-year observations in which fund values are at least
10% above the HWM.
I first estimate the following piecewise linear specification based on the
regions defined above:
Li,k,t =α + β1Li,k,t−1 + β2Moneynessi,k, t−1 ∗D[0,0.85]
+ β3(Moneynessi,k, t−1 − 0.85) ∗D(0.85,0.96] + β4(Moneynessi,k, t−1 − 0.96) ∗D(0.96,1.1]
+ β5(Moneynessi,k, t−1 − 1.1) ∗D(1.1,∞) + β6Managerial ownershipi,k,t−1
+ β7Controlsi,k,t−1 + λt + ηk + εi,k,t,
(4.2)
where Dregion is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the distance to HWM (the
moneyness of the incentive fee option) falls into the corresponding region and 0
otherwise. Other variables are defined as in Equation 4.1.
Table B.4 Panel A presents the piecewise regression results from estimating
Equation 4.2. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using net-return and gross-
return distance measured at the previous year-end. The coefficients for the distance
to the HWM are positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level for the closed-
to-the-money region (0.96,1]. This is consistent with the prediction in H1 that,
compared with the out of the money scenarios, the convexity effect of incentive
fee option is stronger when the option is close to the money. In contrast, the
coefficients for the two out-of-the-money regions are largely insignificant.
Column (3) sheds light on how fund managers adjust risk taking based on
the performance in the first half of the year. Similar to the previous two columns,
fund managers significantly increase the leverage when fund value is close to the
HWM. The insignificant coefficient in the out-of-the-money region (between 0.85
and 0.96) suggests that the leverage is close to Merton flat, consistent with the
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prediction of Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Buraschi et al. (2014). In contrast,
the coefficient of the distance to HWM in the deep-in-the-money region (above
1.1) turns positive and significant, suggesting that fund managers become less risk
averse when they feel secure about getting the incentive fees. This finding partially
supports the predictions in H2 as I don’t find evidence of any decline in risk taking
when the incentive fee option is in the money. Column (4) presents the results
when using year-end distance measure. The coefficients are qualitatively similar
to those in Column (3) but less statistically significant.
To ensure robustness, I next estimate an alternative nonlinear specification
without imposing a linear structure within each region:
Li,k,t =α + β1Li,k,t−1 + β2D[0,0.85],i,k,t−1 + β3D(0.96,1.1],i,k,t−1
+ β4D(1.1,∞0,i,k,t−1 + β5Managerial ownershipi,k,t−1
+ β6Controlsi,k,t−1 + λt + ηk + εi,k,t.
(4.3)
I omit the out-of-the-money region (between 0.85 and 0.96) and use it as the
basis for comparison. As shown in Table B.5 Panel B, the estimation results from
Equation (4.3) are similar to the results from the piecewise specification in Panel
A. For the net-return and gross-return distance measures, I find strong convexity
effect that fund leverage peaks in the close-to-money region (between 0.96 and
1.0). Compared to the out-of-the-money region, fund managers on average increase
the leverage ratio by 6 percentage points when the incentive fee option is close to
the money. When using mid-year distance measure, I find that fund managers
significantly increase their risk taking by 5 percentage points when fund value is
close to the HWM and continue to increase the leverage by another 8 percentage
points when the incentive fee option is deep-in-the-money. In contrast, When
the incentive fee option is deep-out-of-the money (less than 0.85), the coefficient
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on the moneyness becomes negative and statistically significant. Fund managers
significantly decrease the leverage ratio by 6 percentage points when fund value
is more than 15% below the HWM. The results using year-end distance measure
is similar, except that the decline in risk taking in the deep-out-of-money region
is smaller and not statistically significant. This result supports the prediction of
H3B that fund managers reduce risk taking to increase the chance of survival when
fund values are closer to liquidation boundaries. The results are consistent with
the findings of costly liquidation in Lim et al. (2016), which show that indirect
incentives from future inflows of capital, comprise the majority of managers’ total
incentives. Fund managers tend to be prudent when fund value is distant from its
HWM, to increase the likelihood of fund survival and to collect indirect incentives
from future inflows.
In summary, I find robust evidence that managerial incentives are strongly
associated with the risk taking by hedge fund managers. The patterns discovered
in regression analyses are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. The
convexity effect dominates around the HWM as fund managers increase leverage
to become eligible of collecting incentive fees. They become less risk averse and
further increase the leverage when sufficiently above the HWM. In contrast, they
become more risk averse and significantly reduce the risk taking when sufficiently
under the water to avoid liquidation.
The Role of Managerial Ownership in Leverage Decisions
In the previous section, I find that higher managerial ownership is associated
with higher risk taking. It is plausible that the role of managerial ownership varies
in the moneyness of the incentive fee option. As stated in H4, larger personal stakes
expose fund managers to more downside risk and thus discourage them from excess
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risk taking when funds perform poorly. To explore the potential heterogeneous
effects of managerial ownership, I add the interaction of managerial ownership with
the distance to HWM measures in Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) and report
the regression results in Table B.5.
Panel A presents the piecewise regression results from estimating Equation
(4.2). The coefficients on managerial ownership remain positive and significant
after adding the interaction terms. Regarding the interaction terms, the coefficients
for the deep-out-of-the-money region ([0,0.85]) are all negative and statistically
significant for the net-return, gross-return and year-end distance measures. This is
consistent with the conjecture in H4 that a higher personal stake in the fund makes
the manager more risk averse and reluctant to gamble when the fund is performing
poorly. The coefficients in the other three regions are all statistically insignificant
and do not exhibit a consistent pattern. The results from the indicator regression in
Panel B are qualitatively similar. Panel C presents the indicator regression results
with the interactions between the mnoney regions and high ownership indicator,
which equals to 1 if the fund falls into top 30% ownership within the same strategy.
The results of Panel C are consistent with the results of the piecewise regressions
in Panel A, in which funds with high managerial stakes reduce leverage up to 13
percentage points in the deep-out-of-the-money region.
The Implication of Leverage on Fund Flows and Performance
Having examined the role of managerial incentives in determining fund
leverage, I now turn to the impact of leverage on fund flows and performance. This
will shed light on the welfare consequence of leverage decisions on fund investors.
I first examine the sensitivity of fund flows to leverage, especially whether
the sensitivity changes in different distance to HWM (the moneyness of the
35
incentive fee option) regions. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
Flowi,k,t = α + β1Li,k,t−1 ∗D[0,0.85] + β2Li,k,t−1 ∗D(0.85,0.96]
+ β3Li,k,t−1 ∗D(0.96,∞) + β4Managerial ownershipi,k,t−1
+ β5Alpha− 7factorsi,k,t−1 + β6Dreturn below 50%i,k,t−1 + β7V olatilityi,k,t−1
+ β8Controlsi,k,t−1 + λt + ηk + εi,k,t,
(4.4)
where the dependent variable is total net flows, outsider net flows, insider net flows,
or new sales. The main explanatory variables include the leverage ratio or change
in leverage ratio interacting with different distance to HWM regions measured at
the previous year end, the managerial ownership at previous year end, and the
lagged fund performance and return volatility. For fund performance, I include
both Alpha-7factors computed based on the NAV returns from the previous 36
months and an indicator variable Dreturn below 50% that equals one if the fund’s
annual NAV return is below the median of all funds in the same strategy category
in the previous year, and zero otherwise. All other control variables are defined in
the previous tables.
Table B.6 presents the regression results of fund flows on leverage and
managerial ownership. For each flow measures, I report the overall sensitivity
to leverage and the sensitivity in each distance to HWM region as specified in
Equation (4.4). As shown in Panel A, the coefficients of lagged leverage are positive
and statistically significant for all flow measures, suggesting that investors (both
outsiders and insiders) have an overall positive reaction to an increase in leverage.
Panel B breaks down the flow-leverage sensitivity into the three distance to HWM
(moneyness) regions based on net returns. I observe dramatic differences in flow-
leverage sensitivities across regions. The coefficients are mostly insignificant when
the net-return distance is below 0.96. This suggests that investors react cautiously
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to higher leverage when fund value is deep below the HWM, consistent with the
risk shifting concern when the fund performs poorly. In contrast, the flow-leverage
sensitivities are significantly positive when the net-return distance measure is
above 0.96, or in the close-to-the-money region. Hence, investors tend to invest
more capital into higher levered funds that are performing well. The results using
gross-return distance measures are qualitatively similar, which are reported in the
appendix for brevity. In Panel C, I use the change in leverage ratio to interact with
the distance to HWM regions and find similar patterns as those reported in Panel
B.
Further, higher managerial ownership is associated with higher overall fund
flows, outsider flows and new sales (inflows). This suggests that investments from
managers and other insiders serve as a strong signal of aligning interests with
outside investors. Investors appear to chase not only past performance, but also
managerial ownership, possibly understanding that managerial incentives are better
aligned with investors’ interests. The coefficients of control variables are intuitive
and consistent with prior literature. Consistent with the mutual fund literature
and prior hedge fund studies, I also document a strong positive flow-performance
relation. I also find that funds performing poorly relative to their same-category
peers experience large outflows from outside investors. Consistent with Aragon and
Nanda (2012), I find that higher return volatility is associated with larger fund
outflows.
Next, I examine the performance consequences of leverage decisions. Having
shown that leverage decisions vary with managerial incentives (proxied by the
moneyness of incentive option), I am particularly interested in both the overall
performance impact of leverage and whether such impact differs depending on the
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closeness of fund value to the HWM. I estimate the following regression:
Perfi,k,t = α + β1Li,k,t−1 ∗D[0,0.85] + β2Li,k,t−1 ∗D(0.85,0.96]
+ β3Li,k,t−1 ∗D(0.96,∞) + β4Managerial ownershipi,k,t−1
+ β5Net F lowi,k,t−1 + β6Net assetsi,k,t−1 + β7V olatilityi,k,t−1
+ β8Controlsi,k,t−1 + λt + ηk + εi,k,t,
(4.5)
where Perf denotes risk-adjusted monthly return computed using either the NAV
returns or the holdings-based returns. Alpha − 4factors and Alpha − 7factors
are monthly alphas computed based on the four-factor and seven-factor models
as described in Section 3. One endogeneity concern with these two performance
measures is that they are based on NAV returns and thus “contaminated” by the
leverage effect. To address this concern, I also construct two unlevered performance
measures using the holdings-based returns. Holdings − 4factors denotes the
monthly alpha computed from the four-factor model using holdings-based returns
in the previous 36 months. Holdings − CS denotes the Characteristic Selectivity
(CS) measure computed by subtracting the benchmark portfolio returns from the
holdings-based returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)). The
key control variables include managerial ownership, net flows, the logarithm of net
assets, and return volatility. All other controls are defined as in the previous tables.
Table B.7 presents the regression results with NAV-based risk-adjusted
returns as the dependent variable. The results are consistent between the four-
factor and the seven-factor models. Overall, there is a positive and significant
relation between past leverage and future risk-adjusted performance. This suggests
that the use of leverage in general increases investor welfare. When breaking
down into different regions based on the distance to HWM (moneyness), I observe
a strikingly opposite pattern between the deep-out-of-the money and close-to-
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the-money regions. When fund value declines at least 15% below the HWM,
an increase in leverage leads to a significant decline in fund performance. This
highlights the potential danger of levering up any high risk strategies that may
have caused poor fund performance in the first place. In contrast, when fund
value is close to the HWM, levering up the well performing strategies leads to
better risk-adjusted performance and thus further benefits fund investors. I find
a positive relation between fund flows and future performance, consistent with the
smart money effect documented in the mutual fund literature. Among the control
variables, incentive fee is also positively related to fund performance. I also find
evidence that past return volatility and fund size are negatively related to future
returns.
Table B.8 reports the regression results with holdings-based risk-adjusted
returns as the dependent variable. Since Form 13F is filed at the fund advisor
level, I aggregate all explanatory variables across all funds managed by the same
advisor. For total assets, I sum the net assets across all member funds. For other
explanatory variables, I take the TNA-weighted average across all member funds.
Given that fund advisors are only required by the SEC to disclose long equity
positions, I restrict the sample to fund advisors with the disclosed equity positions
accounting for at least 40% of total assets. This explains the drop in the number of
observations available for the holdings-based analysis.
The regression results in Table B.8 are largely consistent with those reported
in Table B.7. I again find a strong and positive overall relation between leverage
ratio and future performance, either the four-factor adjusted alpha or the CS alpha.
This positive overall relation is mainly driven by funds with values sufficiently close
to the HWM. For funds with values sufficiently distant from the HWM, higher
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leverage remains negatively related to future performance but the coefficients are
not statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance could be due to the
smaller sample size given the data limitations.
In summary, I find that investor flows and fund performance have an overall
positive reaction to increases in leverage. The positive relation is mainly driven by
well performing funds with values at least sufficiently close to the HWM. These
results are consistent with the model predictions of Buraschi et al. (2014) and
simulation results of Lim et al. (2016).
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CHAPTER V
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
In this section, I conduct several robustness tests using the various empirical
specifications in the appendix.
To mitigate the sample bias, I construct two samples with different sizes,
one using perfect fund legal name match and the other using fuzzy fund legal name
match. I show that all the main results are robust in Table C.1 using the perfect-
matched sample with equivalent economic magnitude.
To address the concern of endogenous contracting due to different skill
levels, I estimate Equation 4.1 based on the sub-sample with the incentive fee
exactly at 20%. In the sample, 70% of the funds have the 20% incentive fee that
is regular for the whole hedge funds industry. As shown in Table C.2, all the results
remain quantitatively the same with those in Table B.3.
I then conduct robustness tests using the sub-samples with high-water
mark provisions, and with the fund of hedge funds excluded. To mitigate the
concern that funds with or without high-water mark may have distinct managerial
incentives, Table C.3 presents the results of estimating Equation 4.1 for the funds
with high-water mark provisions, which accounts for 90% of the hedge funds. Table
C.3 shows that the main results in Table B.3 are also robust to the sub-sample of
the funds with high-water mark provisions. Given the fund of hedge funds may
have distinct investment strategy than other hedge funds, I exclude them from the
sample and estimate Equation 4.1. Table C.4 shows that the results become more
significantly both statistically and economically after excluding the fund of hedge
funds, which is not surprising considering the mean and variation of leverage levels
of the fund of hedge funds are considerably small.
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Further, I examine whether the estimates of Equation 4.1 are robust to the
specification without the supply side controls, with standard deviation clustered by
strategy, and clustered by fund and by year. Table C.5, Table C.7 and Table C.8
show that the findings are robust to various alternate specifications. I also show
that the findings of performance analysis in Table B.8 for fund advisors with the
disclosed equity positions at least 40% of total assets, is robust to the single-fund
advisor in Table C.8.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Hedge funds distinguish from other investment vehicles by the use of
leverage that trades off the boosted return with the magnified risk exposure.
Further, hedge fund is featured by stable compensation contracts and long-term
investor commitment, which allow fund managers to deploy leverage with wide
discretion.
This study presents the first analysis, to the best of my knowledge, to
comprehensively examine the relation between hedge fund leverage and managerial
incentives, using the new public dataset drawn from SEC filings Form ADV. I
find several interesting and important results. First, I find a positive and convex
relation between the option moneyness and fund leverage, which is particularly
significant as the fund value nears the high-water mark. Second, I find that the
manager becomes more prudent as the fund value distances from high-water
mark, in contrast to risk shifting suggested by conventional wisdom. Further, the
greater managerial ownership is associated with larger leverage, conditional on
the fund value close to its high-water mark. I also find that investor flows and
fund performance have an overall positive reaction to increases in leverage, which
is mainly driven by well performing funds with values sufficiently close to the
HWM. These results are consistent with the model predictions of Buraschi et al.
(2014) and simulation results of Lim et al. (2016), which shed light on the welfare
consequence of leverage decisions on fund investors.
The findings are consistent with the prediction in Ross (2004) and Buraschi
et al. (2014), which show that compared with the out of the money scenarios, the
convexity effect dominates around the HWM. The findings indicate that option-like
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compensation contracts and managerial ownership help align the incentives of fund
managers and investors, and alleviate the agency cost, which lend support to the
model predictions of Lan et al. (2013).
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FIGURES
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Figure A.1. The Scatter Plot of Fund Leverage and Managerial Incentives
This figure depicts the scatter plot of fund leverage with managerial incentives (the incentive
fee option moneyness measures) by fund strategies. The fund leverage is the balance-sheet gross
leverage, defined as the ratio of gross asset value (GAV) to net asset value (NAV). Following
Agarwal et al. (2009), I classify funds into six broad strategies: Directional, Relative Value,
Security Selection, Multi-Process, Fund of funds, and Other. Net-return moneyness is defined
as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the net return following
Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided
by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal et al. (2009).The sample period
is from 2011 to 2016.
Panel A: Fund leverage and Net-return moneyness
Panel B: Fund leverage and Gross-return moneyness
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Figure A.2. The Scatter Plot of Fund Leverage and Contemporaneous Moneyness
This figure depicts the scatter plot of fund leverage with the contemporaneous moneyness
measures. The fund leverage is the balance-sheet gross leverage, defined as the ratio of gross
asset value (GAV) to net asset value (NAV). Following Agarwal et al. (2009), I classify funds into
six broad strategies: Directional, Relative Value, Security Selection, Multi-Process, Fund of funds,
and Other. Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and
year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012).The
sample period is from 2011 to 2016.
Panel A: Fund leverage and contemporaneous Mid-year moneyness
Panel B: Fund leverage and contemporaneous Year-end moneyness
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Table B.1. The Comparison of Fund Characteristics
This table presents the summary statistics of the fund characteristics for the whole sample
and the matched sample over the 2011-2016 period. Gross asset value (GAV) and managerial
ownership data are collected from Form ADV, while net asset value (NAV) and all other
fund characteristics are collected from TASS/HFR. Managerial ownership is the approximate
percentage of the private fund beneficially owned by managers and the related persons from Form
ADV. High-water mark is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has high-water mark
provision, and equals 0 otherwise. Prime broker is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund
has at least one prime broker, and equals 0 otherwise. Lockup period is the minimum time period
that outside investors must wait before they can withdraw their capital. Advance notice period is
the time period that the investors must give notice to the fund about their intention to withdraw.
Redemption period is the time period that the fund takes to return the money after the advance
notice period. Age is the age of the fund after inception in years. There is no significant difference
of fund characteristics between the whole sample and the matched sample, except for prime broker
indicator and fund age. Gross Asset Value and Net Asset Value are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile levels.
Whole Sample Matched Sample
Obs Mean Median SD Obs Mean Median SD
Gross Asset Value (million) 69,984 335 83 746 4,882 390 83 681
Net Asset Value (million) 24,395 217 59 446 4,882 267 66 418
Managerial Ownership (%) 69,984 18 3 30 4,882 21 9 27
Prime Broker Indicator* 69,984 0.54 1.0 0.5 4,882 0.7 1.0 0.5
Redemption Period (days) 26,501 82 90 77 4,882 75 90 65
Management Fee (%) 26,501 1.3 1.5 0.4 4,882 1.4 1.5 0.4
Incentive Fee (%) 26,501 16 20 7 4,882 17 20 7
High-water Mark 26,501 0.8 1.0 0.4 4,882 0.9 1.0 0.3
Advance Notice Period (days) 26,501 52 45 31 4,882 53 45 33
Lockup Period (months) 26,501 6 0 7 4,882 6 0 7
Fund Age* (years) 26,501 7 6 5 4,882 9 9 6
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Table B.2. The Summary Statistics of Fund Leverage and Regression Variables
This table reports the summary statistics for the hedge fund leverage by fund strategies and
the variables of interest in the baseline regression. In Panel A, the fund leverage is the balance-
sheet gross leverage, defined as the ratio of gross asset value (GAV) to net asset value (NAV).
Following Agarwal et al. (2009), I classify funds into six broad strategies: Directional, Relative
Value, Security Selection, Multi-Process, Fund of funds, and Other. I report the number of
observations, means, standard deviation, median, and 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of
the fund leverage distribution. The average and standard deviation of fund leverage in the sample
are similar to the ones of the proprietary data in Ang et al. (2011). Panel B summarizes key
variables of interest in the main regressions for the matched sample. Alpha-4factors and Alpha-
7factors are the intercepts from fund-level time-series regression of monthly excess net returns on
the four factors of Carhart (1997) and the seven factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004). Volatility is
standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. Net flows are the investors’ net dollar
flow at the fiscal year-end scaled by the net assets. Insider Net Flows are the percentage change
of managerial stake. Outsider Net Flows are the percentage change of outside investors’ equity
investments. Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM,
calculated based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness
is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm
following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of
fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and
Nanda (2012). Underwater is an indicator variable that equals 1 if net-return moneyness is less
than 1, and equals 0 otherwise. Option Delta is the total expected percentage change in manager’s
incentive fee for a 1% change in investors’ assets. Option Vega is the total expected percentage
change in manager’s incentive fee for a 1% change in the volatility. Dollar delta is the product of
the option delta and the investors’ assets, and Dollar vega is the product of the option vega and
the investors’ assets, following Agarwal et al. (2009). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016.
Panel A: The summary statistics of the fund leverage
Strategies Num of Obs Num of Funds Mean SD
Relative Value 745 273 1.70 1.09
Security Selection 2104 770 1.39 0.74
Directional Traders 411 156 1.55 1.14
Multiprocess 637 225 1.49 0.88
Fund of Funds 843 282 1.15 0.72
Other 142 46 1.34 0.79
Total 4882 1752 1.42 0.88
Ang et al. (2011) 8136 208 1.5 (after 2009) 0.616
P10 P25 Median P75 P90
Relative Value 1 1.01 1.23 1.76 3.72
Security Selection 1 1 1.14 1.40 2.38
Directional Traders 1 1 1.06 1.36 3.94
Multiprocess 1 1.01 1.16 1.45 3.33
Fund of Funds 1 1 1.01 1.04 1.60
Other 1 1 1.07 1.24 2.47
Total 1 1 1.08 1.35 2.90
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(Table B.2 continued)
Panel B: The summary statistics of the independent variables in the baseline regression
Num of Obs Mean SD P5 P10 P25
Net-return moneyness (%) 4,882 96 9 76 85 96
Gross-return moneyness (%) 3,626 97 8 80 89 97
Mid-year moneyness (%) 4,678 100 11 78 86 96
Year-end moneyness (%) 4,678 102 15 76 85 96
Underwater 4,882 0.38 0.49 0 0 0
Net Flows (%) 4,596 9 63 -49 -33 -15
Insider Net Flows (%) 2,875 30 161 -76 -48 -17
Outsider Net Flows (%) 3,226 11 88 -64 -45 -21
Annual Return (%) 4,715 6 12 -14 -8 -1
Volatility (%) 4,874 2.49 1.81 0.56 0.76 1.21
Monthly Alpha-7factors (%) 2,718 0.22 0.63 -0.85 -0.49 -0.09
Monthly Alpha-4factors (%) 2,696 0.12 0.61 -0.89 -0.58 -0.20
Option Delta (%) 3,497 0.07 0.04 0 0.01 0.04
Option Vega (%) 3,497 0.06 0.03 0 0.01 0.04
Option Delta (\$’000) 3,497 176 399 0 1 8
Option Vega (\$’000) 3,497 143 317 0 3 8
Num of Obs Median P75 P90 P95
Net-return moneyness (%) 4,882 100 100 100 100
Gross-return moneyness (%) 3,626 100 100 100 100
Mid-year moneyness (%) 4,678 102 106 110 113
Year-end moneyness (%) 4,678 103 110 117 123
Underwater 4,882 0 1 1 1
Net Flows (%) 4,596 -2 12 48 103
Insider Net Flows (%) 2,875 0 20 78 204
Outsider Net Flows (%) 3,226 -4 13 54 119
Annual Return (%) 4,715 6 12 21 27
Volatility (%) 4,874 2.00 3.24 4.90 6.09
Monthly Alpha-7factors (%) 2,718 0.23 0.56 0.94 1.25
Monthly Alpha-4factors (%) 2,696 0.13 0.48 0.82 1.10
Option Delta (%) 3,497 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Option Vega (%) 3,497 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Option Delta (\$’000) 3,497 35 130 477 940
Option Vega (\$’000) 3,497 31 104 393 761
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Table B.3. Managerial Incentives and Fund Leverage: Baseline Linear Models
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage, using the lagged and contemporaneous
measures of option moneyness as independent variables. Net-return moneyness is defined as the
ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the net return following Aragon
and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its
HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness
and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior
HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Dprimebrokers is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the fund has at least one prime broker, and equals 0 otherwise. DOnshore is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund is organized in United States, and equals 0 otherwise.
Individual number proportion is the percentage that individuals and high net worth individuals
comprise of the total number of the clients. Individual AUM proportion is the percentage of the
assets under management attributable to individuals and high net worth individuals. The sample
period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression,
I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level.
The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Key variables of interest
Lagged Moneyness Contemporaneous Moneyness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.47***
(3.6)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.39**
(2.3)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.36***
(3.0)
Year− end moneynesst 0.17**
(1.9)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.14*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.13**
(2.7) (2.0) (2.7) (2.5)
Management fee 11.23*** 13.20*** 11.13*** 11.00***
(3.0) (3.1) (3.0) (2.9)
Incentive fee 0.66** 0.66** 0.68*** 0.70***
(2.5) (2.0) (2.6) (2.7)
DPrime brokers 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(5.7) (4.7) (5.6) (5.7)
DOnshore -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10***
(-3.5) (-3.3) (-3.5) (-3.4)
Individual AUM proportion -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.15***
(-4.0) (-3.2) (-4.1) (-4.2)
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(Table B.3 continued)
Panel B: Control variables
Lagged Moneyness Contemporaneous Moneyness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Leveraget−1 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(8.2) (7.0) (8.3) (8.2)
Advance notice period -0.08*** -0.05 -0.09*** -0.09***
(-2.7) (-1.4) (-2.8) (-2.8)
Redemption period -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.9) (-0.7)
Lockup period -0.11 -0.25 -0.13 -0.13
(-0.7) (-1.4) (-0.9) (-0.8)
Volatilityt−1 -2.43*** -2.18*** -2.30*** -2.69***
(-3.5) (-2.9) (-3.3) (-4.1)
Net assett−1 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05**
(2.1) (2.1) (2.2) (2.1)
Net flowt−1, t -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(-4.6) (-3.6) (-4.7) (-4.7)
Fund aget−1 0.64*** 0.40 0.65*** 0.67***
(3.2) (1.5) (3.3) (3.4)
Observations 3,025 2,279 3,025 3,025
Number of funds 1,299 979 1,299 1,299
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43
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Table B.4. Managerial Incentives and Fund Leverage: Piece-wise Regressions
This table presents the piecewise regression results on fund leverage with the same control
variables and specification in the baseline regression. Net-return moneyness is defined as the
ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the net return following Aragon
and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its
HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness
and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior
HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Dmoneyness[0,0.85] is the indicator variable that
equals 1 if the moneyness measures fall below 0.85. Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1] is the indicator variable that equals
1 if the moneyness measures fall between 0.96 and 1.1. The sample period is from 2011 to 2016,
where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect
and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-values are reported in
parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Piecewise regressions
Net-return Gross-return Mid-year Year-end
Moneynesst−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.05 0.02 -0.08* -0.07
(-1.2) (0.4) (-1.9) (-1.3)
(Moneynesst−1 − 0.85)*Dmoneyness[0.85,0.96], t−1 -0.05 0.77* 0.07 -0.25
(-0.2) (1.8) (0.2) (-0.7)
(Moneynesst−1 − 0.96)*Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 0.57*** 3.06*** 0.52** 0.38*
(3.0) (3.4) (2.0) (1.9)
(Moneynesst−1 − 1.1)*Dmoneyness(1.1,∞), t−1 1.16** 0.10
(2.0) (0.5)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.12** 0.12** 0.12*** 0.12***
(2.6) (2.2) (2.6) (3.0)
Management fee 13.41*** 14.49*** 13.34*** 14.4***
(3.8) (3.7) (3.8) (3.7)
Incentive fee 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.93*** 1.05***
(3.8) (2.9) (3.8) (3.8)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,224 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 951 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
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(Table B.4 continued)
Panel B: Dummy regressions
Net-return Gross-return Mid-year Year-end
Dmoneyness[0,0.85], t−1 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06** -0.01
(-0.2) (-1.2) (-2.05) (-0.2)
Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**
(2.3) (2.3) (2.16) (2.0)
Dmoneyness(1.1,∞), t−1 0.08** 0.08**
(2.11) (2.4)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12**
(2.6) (2.7) (2.6) (2.6)
Management fee 13.29*** 13.18*** 13.41*** 13.11***
(3.8) (3.8) (3.9) (3.8)
Incentive fee 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.93*** 0.95***
(3.9) (4.0) (3.8) (3.9)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,224 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 951 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43
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Table B.5. Interaction of Managerial Ownership with Option Incentives
This table presents the regression results on the fund leverage, using the interaction of managerial
ownership with the option moneyness measures. Managerial ownership is the approximate
percentage of the private fund beneficially owned by managers and the related persons from
Form ADV. Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM,
calculated based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness
is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm
following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of
fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and
Nanda (2012). Dmoneyness[0,0.85], t−1 is the indicator variable that equals 1 if the moneyness measures fall
below 0.85. Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 is the indicator variable that equals 1 if the moneyness measures fall
between 0.96 and 1.1. The sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level
data is available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with
standard error clustered at fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Piecewise regressions
Net-return Gross-return Mid-year Year-end
Moneynesst−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.04
(0.8) (0.5) (-0.2) (0.6)
(Moneynesst−1 − 0.85)*Dmoneyness[0.85,0.96], t−1 0.67* 0.94** -0.13 0.24
(1.8) (2.1) (-0.3) (0.6)
(Moneynesst−1 − 0.96)*Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 2.41*** 3.04*** 0.44 0.29
(3.3) (3.3) (1.1) (1.2)
(Moneynesst−1 − 1.1)*Dmoneyness(1.1,∞), t−1 1.00* 0.11
(1.8) (0.4)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.17*** 0.13** 0.14** 0.19**
(3.1) (2.2) (2.1) (2.1)
Ownershipt−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.24** -0.07 -0.35** -0.39**
(-2.0) (-0.4) (-2.5) (-2.0)
Ownershipt−1*(Mt−1 − 0.85)*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 -1.49 -0.92 0.19 -1.88
(-1.4) (-0.9) (0.1) (-1.0)
Ownershipt−1*(Mt−1 − 0.96)*D
moneyness
(0.96,1.1], t−1 4.25 3.94 1.16 -0.32
(1.73) (1.36) (0.7) (-0.4)
Ownershipt−1*(Mt−1 − 1.1)*D
moneyness
(1.1,∞), t−1 3.88 -0.77
(1.17) (-1.0)
Management fee 13.49*** 14.52*** 13.67*** 13.54***
(3.9) (3.7) (3.9) (3.9)
Incentive fee 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.93*** 0.96***
(3.7) (2.9) (3.8) (4.0)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,224 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 951 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.4656
(Table B.5 continued)
Panel B: Moneyness dummy regressions
Net-return Gross-return Mid-year Year-end
Dmoneyness[0,0.85], t−1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05* 0.00
(-1.0) (-0.9) (-1.7) (0.0)
Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 0.06*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06**
(3.0) (2.2) (2.1) (2.2)
Dmoneyness(1.1,∞), t−1 0.08** 0.06*
(2.1) (1.7)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11** 0.12**
(2.7) (2.7) (2.4) (2.5)
Ownershipt−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.35** -0.38 -0.22 -0.28
(-2.1) (-1.2) (-1.4) (-1.3)
Ownershipt−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,1.1], t−1 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.09
(0.7) (0.3) (1.6) (1.0)
Ownershipt−1*D
moneyness
(1.1,∞), t−1 -0.35 -0.30
(-1.3) (-1.1)
Management fee 13.42*** 13.17*** 13.59*** 13.15***
(3.9) (3.8) (3.9) (3.8)
Incentive fee 0.90*** 0.96*** 0.91*** 0.94***
(3.7) (4.0) (3.7) (3.8)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,224 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 951 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44
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(Table B.5 continued)
Panel C: Ownership dummy regressions
Net-return Gross-return Mid-year Year-end
Dmoneyness[0,0.85], t−1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02
(-0.5) (-0.8) (-0.3) (0.5)
Dmoneyness(0.96,1.1], t−1 0.06*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**
(2.6) (2.0) (2.3) (2.2)
Dmoneyness(1.1,∞), t−1 0.08** 0.06
(2.0) (1.6)
Downership top30%, t−1 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.08**
(2.7) (2.8) (2.2) (2.5)
Downership top30%, t−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.13* -0.12
(-1.2) (-0.7) (-1.8) (-1.3)
Downership top30%, t−1*D
moneyness
(0.85,0.96], t−1 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.03
(-0.7) (-1.4) (0.4) (-0.6)
Downership top30%, t−1*D
moneyness
(1.1,∞), t−1 0.01 -0.00
(0.1) (-0.0)
Management fee 13.29*** 13.02*** 13.37*** 13.32***
(3.8) (3.7) (3.8) (3.8)
Incentive fee 0.93*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.96***
(3.8) (4.1) (3.8) (3.9)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,224 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 951 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
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Table B.6. Regression of Fund Flows on Leverage and Managerial Ownership
This table presents the multivariate linear regression results on fund net flows, insider net flows,
outsider net flows and new sales, respectively. Total net flows are the total net dollar flows at the
fiscal year-end scaled by the net assets. Insider net flows are the percentage managerial stake net
flows change. Outsider net flows are the percentage investors’ asset net flow change. New sales is
defined as fund new sales scaled by its net asset, which is derived from Form D. Alpha-7factors
is the intercepts from fund-level time-series regression of monthly excess net returns on the seven
factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004). DReturn below 50%t−1 is the indicator variable that equals 1 if the
fund’s annual raw return is below the median relative to other funds’ within the same strategy
during the same year. The sample period is from 2011 to 2016. In the regressions, I control for
year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-values
are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Leverage level
Total net flows Outsider net flows Insider net flows New sales
Leveraget−1 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.16** 0.03
(4.0) (3.7) (2.2) (1.6)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.13** 0.86*** -0.96*** 0.11**
(2.4) (5.3) (-8.2) (2.2)
Alpha− 7factorst−1 6.65*** 7.40*** 6.30 3.47**
(3.7) (3.0) (1.5) (2.2)
DReturn below 50%t−1 -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.07 -0.06***
(-5.8) (-5.0) (-0.9) (-3.0)
Volatilityt−1 -0.89*** -1.09*** -0.75* -0.97*
(-5.4) (-4.6) (-1.8) (-1.7)
Fund aget−1 1.45*** 2.20*** 1.18** 0.97***
(6.9) (7.0) (2.2) (5.7)
Management fee -2.79 -2.26 -18.04** -5.31**
(-0.7) (-0.4) (-2.2) (-2.1)
Incentive fee -0.03 -0.22 -1.52* -0.73*
(-0.1) (-0.4) (-1.8) (-1.8)
Redemption period 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.00
(1.0) (0.6) (-1.0) (-0.5)
Lockup period -0.32** -0.58*** 0.60 0.11
(-2.3) (-2.9) (1.3) (1.0)
Advance notice period -0.05* -0.08** -0.03 0.00
(-1.7) (-2.1) (-0.4) (0.1)
Net assett−1 -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08 -0.00
(-5.0) (-3.1) (-1.3) (-0.2)
Observations 2,630 2,598 2,322 1,824
Number of funds 1,176 1,159 1,058 834
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.06
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(Table B.6 continued)
Panel B: Interactions with moneyness
Total net flows Outsider net flows Insider net flows New sales
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 0.00 -0.02 0.14 0.01
(0.0) (-0.5) (1.5) (0.2)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 0.05* 0.10 0.06 0.01
(1.7) (1.5) (0.5) (0.3)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,∞), t−1 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.16** 0.03*
(4.2) (4.0) (2.3) (1.8)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.15*** 0.89*** -0.90*** 0.11**
(3.0) (5.5) (-7.9) (2.2)
Alpha− 7factorst−1 4.79*** 5.29** 7.13* 2.98*
(2.8) (2.3) (1.8) (1.9)
DReturn below 50%t−1 -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.07 -0.05**
(-4.5) (-3.8) (-0.9) (-2.3)
Volatilityt−1 -0.69*** -0.84*** -0.75* -0.78
(-4.0) (-3.8) (-1.7) (-1.3)
Fund aget−1 1.35*** 2.07*** 0.94* 0.96***
(6.6) (6.8) (1.8) (5.6)
Management fee -1.57 -0.20 -17.81** -4.98**
(-0.4) (-0.0) (-2.2) (-2.0)
Incentive fee -0.10 -0.32 -1.58* -0.74*
(-0.2) (-0.6) (-1.9) (-1.9)
Redemption period 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.00
(0.6) (0.1) (-1.4) (-0.5)
Lockup period -0.31** -0.55*** 0.66 0.11
(-2.2) (-2.9) (1.4) (1.0)
Advance notice period -0.05* -0.08** -0.02 0.00
(-1.8) (-2.2) (-0.2) (0.0)
Net assett−1 -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07 -0.00
(-4.9) (-3.2) (-1.3) (-0.2)
Observations 2,630 2,598 2,322 1,824
Number of funds 1,176 1,159 1,058 834
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.06
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(Table B.6 continued)
Panel C: Leverage change
Total net flows Outsider flows Insider flows New sales
∆Leveraget−2,t−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.06
(-1.2) (-1.5) (-0.1) (-1.3)
∆Leveraget−2,t−1*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.14
(1.2) (0.0) (0.5) (1.0)
∆Leveraget−2,t−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,∞), t−1 0.16** 0.29*** -0.03 -0.02
(2.4) (3.5) (-0.2) (-0.6)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.13** 0.77*** -0.94*** 0.11*
(2.0) (3.9) (-6.0) (1.8)
Alpha− 7factorst−1 8.82*** 8.96** 10.46 5.88**
(3.4) (2.4) (1.2) (2.4)
DReturn below 50%t−1 -0.11*** -0.16*** 0.02 -0.04*
(-3.8) (-3.6) (0.2) (-1.7)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,553 1,534 1,379 1,128
Number of funds 889 879 794 652
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.06
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Table B.7. The Effect of Leverage and Flows on Fund NAV Returns
This table presents the multivariate linear regression results on monthly risk-adjusted nav return.
Alpha-4factors and Alpha-7factors are the monthly risk-adjusted returns using Carhart four factor
model and seven factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004), respectively. Annual return is the net-
of-fee annual return collected from TASS/HFR. Insider net flows are the percentage managerial
stake net flows change. Outsider net flows are the percentage investors’ asset net flow change. The
sample period is from 2011 to 2016. In the regressions, I control for year fixed effect and strategy
fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses,
with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Alpha− 4t Alpha− 4t Alpha− 7t Alpha− 7t
Leveraget−1 0.009*** 0.006**
(3.0) (2.1)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.063*** -0.036***
(-3.4) (-2.9)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 -0.010** -0.003
(-2.3) (-0.8)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,∞), t−1 0.012*** 0.007***
(4.2) (2.8)
Insider netflowt−1 0.002** 0.002 0.003*** 0.002***
(2.1) (1.5) (3.3) (2.8)
Outsider netflowt−1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.002
(3.4) (3.5) (1.2) (1.4)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.012 0.025** -0.009 -0.000
(0.9) (2.1) (-0.9) (-0.0)
Management fee 1.054 1.214 2.671** 2.824***
(1.0) (1.2) (2.5) (2.8)
Incentive fee 0.126* 0.108* 0.176** 0.165**
(1.8) (1.7) (2.5) (2.6)
Redemption period -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.004
(-0.2) (-0.9) (1.3) (1.1)
Lockup period 0.007 0.004 -0.032 -0.033
(0.1) (0.1) (-0.7) (-0.8)
Advance notice period 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.012
(1.6) (1.3) (1.2) (0.9)
Volatilityt−1 -0.029*** -0.020** -0.023*** -0.020***
(-3.1) (-2.4) (-3.5) (-3.1)
Net assett−1 -0.021* -0.016* -0.006 -0.004
(-1.7) (-1.7) (-0.6) (-0.5)
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,076 1,076
Number of funds 692 692 643 643
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.14 0.26 0.15 0.26
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Table B.8. The Effect of Leverage on Fund Holding Performance
This table reports the multivariate panel regression results on the risk-adjusted holding return.
Holdings-4factors is the intercept from time-series regression of quarterly excess holding returns
on the four factors of Carhart (1997). Holdings-CS is the Characteristic Selectivity (CS) measure
of the holding returns, which is defined as the difference between the holding return and the
benchmark return of securities with similar size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics
as proposed by Daniel et al. (1997). The sample is based on the hedge fund advisor with at least
40% holdings in equity markets from 2011 to 2016. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Holdings− 4t Holdings− 4t Holdings− CSt Holdings− CSt
Leveraget−1 0.005** 0.006**
(2.3) (2.1)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.001 -0.003
(-0.3) (-0.4)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 0.003 0.002
(1.2) (0.4)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,∞), t−1 0.005** 0.007**
(2.3) (2.1)
Turnovert−1 0.016 0.014 0.043* 0.042*
(1.5) (1.3) (1.9) (1.8)
Redemption period 0.004** 0.004** 0.006 0.005
(2.2) (2.2) (1.1) (1.2)
Netflowst−1 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02
(-1.2) (-1.2) (0.3) (0.2)
Total assetst−1 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.1) (-0.2) (-0.6) (-0.3)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.4) (0.5) (0.1) (0.2)
Management fee 0.305 0.244 0.157 0.036
(1.1) (0.9) (0.2) (0.0)
Incentive fee 0.060 0.065 0.020 0.025
(1.3) (1.5) (0.2) (0.3)
Lockup period 0.032 0.031 -0.035 -0.030
(1.5) (1.5) (-0.9) (-0.7)
Advance notice period -0.011 -0.012 -0.033* -0.036*
(-1.2) (-1.3) (-1.9) (-1.9)
Volatilityt−1 -0.083** -0.075** -0.132*** -0.138***
(-2.4) (-2.3) (-4.9) (-5.6)
Strategy fixed effect No No No No
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
Observations 797 797 797 797
R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.24 0.25
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APPENDIX C
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Table C.1. Baseline Linear Model with the Perfect-matched Sample
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage, using the lagged and contemporaneous
measures of option moneyness as independent variables. Net-return moneyness is defined as the
ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the net return following Aragon
and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its
HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness
and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior
HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016,
where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect
and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-value are reported in
parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Key variables of interest
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net− return distancet−1 0.36**
(2.3)
Gross− return distancet−1 0.45**
(2.0)
Mid− year distancet 0.31*
(2.0)
Year− end distancet 0.19*
(1.9)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.17*** 0.17** 0.17*** 0.17***
(2.7) (2.5) (2.7) (2.7)
Management fee 10.94*** 15.21*** 11.10*** 10.97***
(2.7) (3.5) (2.7) (2.6)
Incentive fee 0.81*** 0.86** 0.82*** 0.82***
(2.8) (2.3) (2.8) (2.8)
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(Table C.1 continued)
Panel B: Control variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Redemption period -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-2.7) (-2.5) (-2.6) (-2.6)
Lockup period -0.11 -0.25 -0.13 -0.13
(-0.5) (-0.7) (-0.5) (-0.5)
Advance notice period -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(-3.2) (-2.6) (-3.3) (-3.3)
Net assett−1 0.04* 0.06* 0.04* 0.04*
(1.7) (1.8) (1.7) (1.7)
Fund aget−1 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 0.01**
(2.0) (-0.3) (2.1) (2.1)
Volatilityt−1 -2.27*** -2.23*** -2.23*** -2.55***
(-2.9) (-2.8) (-2.8) (-3.3)
Net flowt−1, t -0.09*** -0.05 -0.10*** -0.10***
(-3.1) (-1.5) (-3.1) (-3.1)
Leveraget−1 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.36***
(7.2) (5.2) (7.0) (7.1)
Observations 1,872 1,420 1,872 1,872
Number of funds 765 587 765 765
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.52 0.46 0.48 0.48
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Table C.2. Robustness Tests: Subsample with 20% Incentive Fee
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage for funds with 20% incentive fee. Net-
return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based
on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the
ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal
et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and
year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). The
sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the
regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at
fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.47***
(2.8)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.35*
(1.8)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.35**
(2.3)
Year− end moneynesst 0.17
(1.6)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.13** 0.12* 0.12** 0.12**
(2.2) (1.7) (2.1) (2.1)
Management fee 14.51*** 18.17*** 14.35*** 14.08***
(3.0) (3.7) (3.0) (2.9)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,133 1,642 2,133 2,133
Number of funds 914 702 914 914
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
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Table C.3. Robustness Tests: Subsample with High-water Mark Provision
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage for funds with high-water mark
provision. Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM,
calculated based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness
is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm
following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of
fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and
Nanda (2012). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is
available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard
error clustered at fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.47***
(3.2)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.32*
(1.8)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.35***
(2.6)
Year− end moneynesst 0.15
(1.6)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.14** 0.12** 0.14** 0.13**
(2.6) (2.1) (2.5) (2.4)
Management fee 10.67** 13.52*** 10.75** 10.61**
(2.4) (2.7) (2.4) (2.3)
Incentive fee 0.66* 0.77 0.68* 0.68*
(1.9) (1.6) (1.9) (1.9)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,631 2,018 2,631 2,631
Number of funds 1,140 873 1,140 1,140
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
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Table C.4. Robustness Tests: Subsample with the Fund of Hedge Funds Excluded
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage with the fund of hedge funds excluded.
Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated
based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as
the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal
et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and
year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). The
sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the
regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at
fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.49***
(3.5)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.43**
(2.4)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.37***
(2.9)
Year− end moneynesst 0.17*
(1.8)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.15** 0.12* 0.15** 0.14**
(2.4) (1.9) (2.4) (2.3)
Management fee 11.13** 13.70*** 11.06** 10.93**
(2.5) (2.8) (2.5) (2.4)
Incentive fee 0.81** 0.81* 0.84** 0.85**
(2.4) (1.9) (2.5) (2.5)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,483 1,894 2,483 2,483
Number of funds 1,074 815 1,074 1,074
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
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Table C.5. Robustness Tests: Specification without Supply Side Controls
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage without supply side controls. Net-
return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based
on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness is defined as the
ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm following Agarwal
et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of fund’s mid-year and
year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and Nanda (2012). The
sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the
regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at
fund level. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.33***
(2.6)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.33**
(2.1)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.34***
(3.1)
Year− end moneynesst 0.16**
(2.1)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.12*** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.12***
(2.7) (2.1) (2.6) (2.6)
Management fee 14.55*** 15.70*** 14.36*** 14.21***
(4.4) (4.2) (4.3) (4.3)
Incentive fee 0.84*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.86***
(3.6) (3.0) (3.6) (3.7)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,025 2,279 3,025 3,025
Number of funds 1,299 979 1,299 1,299
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
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Table C.6. Robustness Tests: Standard Error Clustered by Strategy
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage with standard error clustered by
strategy. Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM,
calculated based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness
is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm
following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of
fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and
Nanda (2012). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is
available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard
error clustered by strategy. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.47***
(4.4)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.39***
(3.3)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.36***
(3.2)
Year− end moneynesst 0.17**
(2.1)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.14*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.13**
(2.7) (2.3) (2.8) (2.6)
Management fee 11.23*** 13.20*** 11.13*** 11.00**
(2.6) (3.3) (2.6) (2.5)
Incentive fee 0.66*** 0.66** 0.68*** 0.70***
(3.6) (2.0) (3.7) (3.8)
Observations 3,025 2,279 3,025 3,025
Number of funds 1,299 979 1,299 1,299
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By strategy By strategy By strategy By strategy
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43
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Table C.7. Robustness Tests: Standard Error Clustered by Fund and Year
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage with standard error clustered by fund
and year. Net-return moneyness is defined as the ratio of a fund’s NAV divided by its HWM,
calculated based on the net return following Aragon and Nanda (2012). Gross-return moneyness
is defined as the ratio of fund’s NAV divided by its HWM, calculated based on the algorithm
following Agarwal et al. (2009). Mid-year moneyness and Year-end moneyness are the ratios of
fund’s mid-year and year-end NAV divided by its prior HWM, respectively, following Aragon and
Nanda (2012). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is
available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard
error clustered by fund and year. The t-value are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Net return moneynesst−1 0.42***
(6.4)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.25*
(2.2)
Mid− year moneynesst 0.30**
(4.1)
Year− end moneynesst 0.17
(1.9)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.14* 0.12* 0.14* 0.14*
(2.7) (2.2) (2.8) (2.7)
Management fee 6.03*** 6.59 5.96*** 5.79***
(4.7) (2.1) (5.0) (4.7)
Incentive fee 0.32 0.27 0.34 0.36
(1.5) (1.0) (1.5) (1.6)
Observations 3,025 2,279 3,025 3,025
Number of funds 1,299 979 1,299 1,299
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund&year By fund&year By fund&year By fund&year
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43
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Table C.8. The Effect of Leverage on Performance for Single-fund Family
This table reports the multivariate panel regression results on the risk-adjusted holding return for
the single-fund family. Holdings-4factors is the intercept from time-series regression of quarterly
excess holding returns on the four factors of Carhart (1997). Holdings-CS is the Characteristic
Selectivity (CS) measure of the holding returns, which is defined as the difference between the
holding return and the benchmark return of securities with similar size, book-to-market, and
momentum characteristics as proposed by Daniel et al. (1997). The sample is based on the hedge
fund advisor with at least 40% holdings in equity markets from 2011 to 2016. The t-value are
reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Holdings-CS Holdings-CS Holdings-4 Holdings-4
Leveraget−1 0.0012*** 0.0005
(3.9) (0.3)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0,0.85], t−1 -0.0019 -0.0001
(-1.6) (-0.0)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
[0.85,0.96], t−1 0.0022 -0.0003
(0.2) (-0.0)
Leveraget−1*D
moneyness
(0.96,∞), t−1 0.0013*** 0.0052
(3.5) (1.5)
Net flows 0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02 -0.04
(4.1) (4.1) (-0.3) (-0.1)
Turnover 0.001 0.004 -0.101* -0.138**
(0.0) (0.1) (-1.8) (-2.3)
Total assets 0.002 0.001 0.023* 0.025*
(0.2) (0.2) (1.8) (1.9)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.018
(-0.1) (-0.2) (0.2) (0.7)
Management fee -1.26 -1.27 0.72 0.35
(-1.3) (-1.4) (0.5) (0.3)
Incentive fee 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.33**
(3.2) (3.1) (2.8) (2.8)
Lockup period 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.06
(0.6) (0.6) (-0.6) (-0.6)
Redemption period 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.3) (1.3) (1.1) (1.1)
Advance notice period -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
(-1.5) (-1.5) (-1.4) (-1.7)
Volatilityt−1 -0.48 -0.42 -0.14 0.05
(-1.4) (-1.2) (-0.5) (0.2)
Strategy fixed effect No No No No
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
Observations 242 242 41 41
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.45 0.50
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APPENDIX D
OTHER RESULTS
Table D.1. Option Delta/Vega and Fund Leverage
This table presents the baseline multivariate linear regression results on fund leverage, using the
option delta and vega, while controlling for the lagged leverage. Option Delta is the total expected
percentage change in manager’s incentive fee for a 1% change in investors’ assets. Option Vega is
the total expected percentage change in manager’s incentive fee for a 1% change in the volatility,
based on the algorithm following Agarwal et al. (2009). The sample period is from 2011 to 2016,
where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect
and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-value are reported in
parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Key variables
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Option Deltat−1 153.62*** 154.79***
(4.3) (3.9)
Option Deltat−1 ∗DDeltatop30%, t−1 -23.86
(-0.9)
Option Deltat−1 ∗DDeltabottom30%, t−1 -88.91**
(-2.0)
Option Vegat−1 215.60*** 164.66***
(4.1) (3.2)
Option Vegat−1 ∗D
V ega
top30%, t−1 51.64*
(1.6)
Option Vegat−1 ∗D
V ega
bottom30%, t−1 -161.89***
(-2.8)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11**
(2.2) (2.2) (2.1) (2.1)
Management fee 14.54*** 14.62*** 14.14*** 13.91***
(3.8) (3.8) (3.7) (3.6)
Incentive fee 0.26 0.16 0.33 0.22
(0.8) (0.5) (1.0) (0.7)
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(Table D.1 continued)
Panel B: Control variables
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Leveraget−1 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(7.0) (7.0) (7.0) (7.0)
Redemption period -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.2) (-1.2) (-1.2) (-1.3)
Lockup period -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26
(-1.5) (-1.5) (-1.4) (-1.5)
Advance notice period -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.5)
Volatilityt−1 -2.38*** -2.46*** -2.31*** -2.25***
(-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.3) (-3.2)
Net assett−1 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(2.8) (2.7) (2.8) (2.8)
Net flowt−1, t -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(-3.9) (-3.9) (-3.9) (-3.9)
Fund aget−1 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.33
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.3)
Constant 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.75***
(5.8) (5.7) (5.8) (6.0)
Observations 2,224 2,224 2,224 2,224
Number of funds 951 951 951 951
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
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Table D.2. Heterogeneous Effect of Option Delta/Vega
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage, using the contemporaneous measures
of option delta and vega as independent variables. ContemporaneousOption Deltat is calculated
based on the mid-year moneyness, which is the mid-year percentage differences between fund’s
NAV and its HWM, following Aragon and Nanda (2011). Din the money is the indicator variable
that equals 1 if the mid-year moneyness is no less than 1. The sample period is from 2011 to 2016,
where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression, I control for year fixed effect
and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The t-values are reported in
parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Full sample with interaction In-the-money subsample
Option Deltat 162.78** 214.31***
(2.3) (2.8)
Option Deltat*Din the money -110.59*
(-1.7)
Option Vegat 141.10*** -194.47***
(3.5) (-2.6)
Option Vegat*Din the money -204.43***
(-3.1)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.12** 0.12** 0.18*** 0.18***
(2.5) (2.6) (3.2) (3.2)
Management fee 14.15*** 14.20*** 15.65*** 15.93***
(3.9) (4.0) (4.1) (4.1)
Incentive fee 0.51* 0.52* -1.06 1.02
(1.8) (1.8) (-1.4) (1.2)
Observations 2,663 2,663 1,871 1,871
Number of fund 1,169 1,169 963 963
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46
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Table D.3. Dela/Vega with Supply Side Controls
This table presents the regression results on fund leverage with supply side controls. Dprimebrokers
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has at least one prime broker, and equals 0
otherwise. DOnshore is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund is organized in United
States. Individual number is the percentage that individuals and high net worth individuals
comprise of the total number of the clients. Individual amount is the percentage of the assets
under management attributable to individuals and high net worth individuals. The sample period
is from 2011 to 2016, where the Form ADV fund level data is available. In the regression, I control
for year fixed effect and strategy fixed effect with standard error clustered at fund level. The
t-values are reported in parentheses, with * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DPrime brokers 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(5.7) (4.8) (4.8) (4.8)
DOnshore -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(-3.7) (-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.5)
Individual num portion -0.08** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.08**
(-2.4) (-2.6) (-2.4) (-2.4)
Net return moneynesst−1 0.46***
(3.5)
Gross return moneynesst−1 0.35**
(2.1)
Option Vegat−1 215.33***
(3.9)
Option Deltat−1 160.07***
(4.2)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.12** 0.09* 0.09 0.09*
(2.3) (1.6) (1.6) (1.7)
Management fee 13.88*** 15.70*** 15.82*** 15.76***
(3.7) (3.7) (3.7) (3.7)
Incentive fee 0.75*** 0.74** 0.03 0.11
(2.9) (2.3) (0.1) (0.3)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916
Number of funds 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,252
Strategy fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster By fund By fund By fund By fund
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE FORM ADV
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Figure E.1. An Excerpt from Form ADV
This figure is an sample excerpt from Form ADV of Two Sigma compass enhanced fund for the
fiscal year 2016. Section 7.B provides fund-level information including GAV and ownership by
“related persons”, and Item 7.A identifies “related persons”.
Panel A: Item 7.A of the sample Form ADV
78
(Figure E.1 continued)
Panel B: Section 7.B of the sample Form ADV
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